What USMNT Can Expect From Mauricio Pochettino Tactics & Formations

Mauricio Pochettino has been appointed head coach of the USMNT.

Originally published in 2022, in this piece, we revisit Mauricio Pochettino’s tactics and formations during his time at Paris Saint-Germain, which give us some clues on what USMNT can expect from Mauricio Pochettino.

Who Is Mauricio Pochettino?

Mauricio Pochettino’s time as Paris Saint-Germain boss has ended.

Unsuccessfully, many would say, at that.

The former manager of Espanyol, Southampton and, famously, Tottenham Hotspur did manage to win the first silverware of his career in France, in the form of the 2020 Trophée des Champions, 2020/21 Coupe de France and 2021/22 Ligue 1.

However, given the seismic investment in this PSG squad, Pochettino’s tenure at Le Parc des Princes will most likely be remembered for a failure to finally bring the highly coveted UEFA Champions League trophy to Paris — an achievement that would be seen by the PSG hierarchy as placing a most cherished jewel in the centre of their crown.

Indeed, more was expected of ‘Poch’ in Paris but with that said, the Argentinian coach shouldn’t be solely judged on this outcome, given that he was handed a squad that clearly wasn’t built in his ideal image.

Of course, he had tonnes of talent at his disposal, but the front wheels of his supercar were immobilised in reverse, leading to the other wheels having to do more than they were able to manage, in the end.

It’s known that Poch likes his teams to defend aggressively and intensely from the front and the fact that Kylian Mbappé, Lionel Messi and Neymar all can’t be described as pressing monsters undoubtedly hindered the philosophical Marcelo Bielsa-inspired coach.

If Pochettino was somewhat overhyped going into his PSG reign, he has been over criticised in the wake of his PSG reign, as while this squad has immense talent in its ranks on the ball, it also ironically doesn’t lend itself to what would be described as an ideal modern game that you see deployed by the likes of Liverpool and Manchester City — widely recognised as two of the best teams in the world right now — where the effort they put in without the ball is as crucial as what they do with it.

This is something Pochettino will have been very aware of.

I don’t suggest people should feel sorry for Poch.

Of course he had a great, talented squad at his disposal, but I also don’t think his failure to win the Champions League with them should be seen as the catastrophic underachievement some would like to see it as nor was it a case of poor tactical understanding.

If given the chance to build a squad with the exact profiles he requires, Pochettino would produce a fantastic brand of football for the world to admire as he has in the past.

Even without those profiles, he can have a team compete at about the level they should.

However, for his next job, I think it’s clear that Pochettino needs to be careful and not jump at the first chance that comes his way, but rather ensure that it’s a project that aligns with his footballing ideals, given how quickly public perception and reputation can alter in the fickle footballing landscape.

He’s got a point to prove.

This Mauricio Pochettino tactical analysis piece retrospectively analyses Poch’s tenure at PSG and what it says about his footballing philosophy.

We’ll look at some of the notable strategies and tactics that Les Parisiens deployed under Poch and determine, via our analysis, what we feel Pochettino’s next club can expect from the Argentinian.

Mauricio Pochettino Tactics & Formations

As mentioned, Poch was unable to defend with the intensity he’d typically like to during his time at PSG due to the lack of defensive effort and ability in his forward line.

His PSG team had a PPDA of 9.86 — still the fourth-lowest in Ligue 1, an indication of his team’s territorial dominance and strength in general, as well as the fact that Poch still did a decent job coaching the press as best he could in this environment.

With that said, PSG in 2021/22 had the highest PPDA of any PSG side in any season with data available on Wyscout (going back to 2015/16).

Is that an indication of Poch’s intent or the arrival of Lionel Messi and how that affected the team dynamics? Likely the latter, as Poch’s Southampton and Tottenham sides, in particular, were known for their intensity off the ball.

Interestingly, Poch’s Spurs side increased PPDA gradually in the Premier League year-on-year, slowly becoming less intense than they had been at the beginning of the Argentinian’s tenure.

There could be an interesting case study there to determine why — whether it’s mainly down to personnel or perhaps Poch’s methods wearing people down slowly over time.

Either way, for me, it is an interesting observation and perhaps backs the Argentinian’s claims at the end of his time in North London that a “painful” rebuild was necessary for his squad.

This rebuild never came and Pochettino was ultimately the fall guy.

What the end of his time at Spurs and his time at PSG may indicate is that Pochettino works best with fresh minds and fresh bodies ready to buy into his ideas, though doing it for the long haul — or, in the case of some at PSG, fully buying into his ideas at all — isn’t for everyone.

So, Pochettino couldn’t defend in his ideal way but he was still being tasked with guiding a highly-talented squad full of elite ballers to Europe’s greatest prize against more well-rounded squads.

What to do? Pochettino decided to show himself as a bit of a gambler, foregoing his defensive ideals to an extent and instead, deciding to use the offensive threat of his lethal front three as a defensive weapon — a deterrent, of sorts, for the opposition to send too many bodies forward.

This is something I can also recall Luis Enrique doing during his time in charge of the MSN-led Barcelona — when Messi and Neymar previously lined up alongside each other and it was necessary to work around their defensive deficiencies to exploit their obvious offensive qualities.

We see an example of this in figures 1-2.

Here in figure 1, we see PSG defending the edge of their box with just seven outfield players back.

There was one more player just out of shot in the process of tracking back in this case; meanwhile, Messi and Mbappé were sitting at the other end of the pitch, hoping they’d get an opportunity to counter-attack.

We see that this opportunity did come in figure 2, as new Juventus signing Ángel Di María began carrying the ball forward on the right wing.

Mbappé and Messi (and/or Neymar, depending on if all three of these star attackers were playing or if it were a combination of two instead) enjoy a qualitative advantage against most three-man defensive lines in world football, hence why this strategy did prove so effective at times and did make sense from Poch.

His idea was to hopefully have enough men back defending in an organised way so that his side would regain possession and be able to quickly get it forward for his star-studded frontline to exploit their qualitative advantage over the remaining opposition defenders.

This notably worked very well against Manchester City in the Champions League group stage, for example, as we see in figure 3.

Here, against one of Europe’s most dynamic and difficult-to-stop attacks, Pochettino deployed all three of Neymar, Mbappé and Messi.

In a way, this was Poch challenging his opponent, Pep Guardiola, to throw the first punch and see if it knocks him down.

If it does, then congratulations — Pep wins and Poch looks foolish for allowing that punch to be thrown.

If it doesn’t connect, though, and Poch is allowed to now target an open Pep with a counterpunch of his own, then his strategy appears brilliant.

In this case against Man City, we saw an example of the latter, as PSG managed to regain possession with one of their seven men on the edge of their box before breaking and getting the ball to Messi on the right wing.

From there, the Barcelona legend could dance through the City defence and get into a good shooting position from the right side of the box on his fabled left foot.

The rest was history and PSG ended this game with a 2-0 victory.

Of course, gambling is risky.

You’re not guaranteed your ideal result every time and on occasion, this gamble did come back to bite Pochettino.

One such occasion was in PSG’s Champions League Round of 16 loss to eventual tournament winners Real Madrid.

Figure 4 shows an example of PSG defending with their seven men in front of the box against a Real Madrid attack in the second leg of their Round of 16 tie — the leg in which Los Blancos came back from their 1-0 first leg defeat to beat Les Parisiens 3-1.

This particular attack didn’t result in a goal but does show us one way in which Real hurt PSG throughout this game, by exploiting the lack of width that their 4-3-0-3 defensive shape allowed.

By exercising patience and working the ball into the danger zone from this kind of position, Real created plenty of opportunities in this game and this eventually helped them to win the contest.

PSG also had plenty of opportunities in this game, mind, but Mbappé was caught offside too many times — perhaps both a result of Real’s understanding of Poch’s wish to play Mbappé through in behind the backline (we’ll get onto that) and poor timing of the run from Mbappé, at times.

This gamble was evident in PSG games throughout the 2021/22 season and may tell us a lot about Pochettino.

The Argentinian coach would ideally defend in a far more compact unit and far more aggressively from the front.

However, if that option is not available and he’s forced to compromise in some way, as was the case last term, he will compromise defensively, not offensively.

Perhaps that was a result of the options that PSG had available, perhaps he felt he had to play the star attackers when available and that forced him to compromise without the ball rather than with the ball — this is difficult to say.

But, what’s clear, is that Pochettino felt maximising his team’s attacking power even at the expense of some of their defensive power was the way to go.

He went for a counterpunching approach that allowed the opposition to take their shot first and just hope they weren’t successful to create a good chance to exploit their defence at the other end via their qualitative advantage over an approach that exercised caution and prioritised defensive protection.

From this, we can see that Pochettino’s philosophical ideals may be weighted more heavily towards the attacking side of things, the on-the-ball side of things, than the off-the-ball side of things.

However, perhaps this may also hammer home that both the on-the-ball ideals and off-the-ball ideals are necessary requirements to meet in order to achieve maximum success under Mauricio Pochettino — just the attacking ideals aren’t enough.

This could be a lesson Poch will take into his next job and influence him to take more caution with selecting his project, ensuring it matches his ideals entirely.

Perhaps Pochettino’s next club, then, will be one where he won’t need to make this compromise a key component of the tactical setup.

However, if a compromise like this is ever forced upon him through circumstance, expect the Argentinian to prioritise the attacking, on-the-ball ideals and maximise what his team can do with the ball, first and foremost.

Mauricio Pochettino Tactics In possession

A gambler isn’t someone you’d typically associate with prudence but for Poch at PSG, the two words go together quite well in a way.

The gambler analogy was explained in our previous section, the prudence can be explained by Poch’s approach when his team did have the ball, and how cautious they proved to be with it.

They had a very particular way of attacking and generally stuck to that approach quite rigidly.

Of course, the creative players — especially those in that gargantuan front three — had the freedom to create, and this requires an element of freedom, which they received.

However, getting the ball to them and even the end goal of what they would do when they did get the ball was quite regulated.

PSG had the fewest ball losses in Ligue 1 last season (74.78 per 90).

This was despite ending the campaign with the third-most dribbles (31.58 per 90) of any Ligue 1 side.

Having the fewest ball losses in the league won’t be a major surprise, as this has been the case for PSG in every season with data available on Wyscout but last season was also the fewest ball losses they’ve had since 2016/17.

Most of their ball losses came from their creative players upfield who, again, needed to be let off the leash a little bit for the attack to actually go anywhere.

Neymar had the most of any PSG player, with Di María following, then Mbappé, Messi and then Verratti — the latter of whom frequently operated high up between the lines as, essentially, a number ‘10’ to receive and link up with the frontline.

Where Poch cut down ball losses was from deeper-positioned players, who had to operate in a very cautious way, while still exercising enough proactiveness to break lines with their forward passing and get the ball to their creators.

While PSG made the most passes of any Ligue 1 side last term (613.56 per 90), they made the fewest long passes (26.24 per 90) of any Ligue 1 side in 2021/22.

Furthermore, last season saw PSG make fewer long passes than they’d made in any season preceding that campaign with data available on Wyscout.

This is indicative of the controlled nature of Pochettino’s possession play up until the chance creation phase.

He didn’t want his team giving the ball away too easily, probably partly because of the fact that his team was so vulnerable and so much more ineffective without the ball, so he wanted them to maximise their time on the ball, be cautious and build carefully into the final third, where then they could take more risks.

We see a typical example of PSG’s build-up play under Pochettino in figure 5 — this time, taken from their successful 1-0 victory over Real Madrid at home.

We see how they looked to overload one side of the pitch, getting bodies close together and forming essentially a rondo shape with elite ball progressor Leandro Paredes in the centre to facilitate moving through Real Madrid’s press.

This saw them meticulously short pass and move off the ball to create angles for more short passing until the right opportunity to carefully move forward appeared.

This came as the ball made its way into Paredes here in figure 5 and the Argentinian midfielder was able to turn before sending the ball onto his compatriot, Messi, at the tip of this shape.

The dribbler could then receive, turn and carry his team into the opposition’s half.

It was very common to see Poch’s PSG looking to overload central areas with as many bodies as necessary.

In figure 6, centre-back Marquinhos had just carried the ball forward into the midfield area, attracting some opposition players towards him; meanwhile, Messi dropped deep into the midfield zone behind those players attracted to Marquinhos.

Messi attracted another player to him, leaving Paredes free to receive the ball in midfield and then progress to Verratti who’s moved up between the lines to receive and facilitate progression 1.

Into the final third and 2.

To Mbappé coming inside off the left wing.

We see another example of PSG utilising similar tactics in ball progression in figure 7.

Again, they’ve overloaded the centre, leaving just Mbappé (centrally), along with the left-back and right-back (on either wing) elsewhere.

Everyone else in the opposition half was positioned centrally, behind the opposition’s pressure, giving each other a chance to link up with one another and draw the opposition’s shape out, creating space for pacey Mbappé to target in behind.

It was absolutely key for Poch’s side to offer width on both wings at all times in the progression/chance creation phases, while it was also pivotal that they had someone (usually Mbappé) offering movement in behind the opposition’s backline.

The last key thing? Intelligent link-up play and movement in the centre of the pitch to control this area, control possession, guard against a counter-attack straight through the centre of the pitch and help each other set up goalscoring opportunities — be that via a through ball for Mbappé or the wide men to capitalise on or by exploiting space between the lines if the opposition pushed out to close down the passers.

Messi was key in this regard as giving him too much space when he dropped deep would be disastrous, as he has the ability to carry the ball through a defensive block and score.

However, committing defenders high was also dangerous, as it would allow Mbappé space to target behind the defensive line.

I think controlling the game via possession when they are on the ball is evidently a crucial part of Pochettino’s philosophy.

This includes minimising cheap ball losses and building meticulously through the thirds into a goalscoring position until they reach the creators of the team, who would be given more freedom to make things happen in the final third.

Concerning his next challenge, whenever and wherever that may be, I’d expect to see this element of total, central control on the ball remain part of Poch’s game plan while fitting other threats around that ready to spring when the chance presents itself, like the runners in behind and out wide, in this case.

Predictability in possession?

Assuming the ball carrier had time and space to pick out the run, as was often the case, including in figure 7, then this link-up was also lethal and something Pochettino aimed to exploit time and time again last term.

We see another example of these tactics in figure 8.

Again, all of the key aspects of their shape and tactics in the opposition’s half are evident in this image, as was the case in figure 9.

They had one man looking to provide an option in behind (Neymar, on this occasion), while the others looked to provide options for shorter passes or in the wide areas, including the opposite wing for a switch to exploit space created there, by this overload on the right.

However, most frequently, we saw Poch’s team look to exploit the space behind the opposition’s backline, to the point where it may be fair to wonder if a lack of a ‘plan B’ or at least willingness to switch to that plan B was one of the things that hurt Poch’s side and their march to success as much as anything else.

Against Real Madrid in the Champions League Round of 16, Mbappé was caught offside on numerous occasions, even scoring two goals that were later ruled out for offside.

It was clear that Real had prepared well for these exact tactics from Les Parisiens, while it was also clear that while breaching the opposition’s backline in this way was very possible, it also wasn’t working.

Had PSG switched things up more regularly and presented different challenges to the opposition backline, could that have helped them avoid a Round of 16 crash-out? It’s impossible to say, but their over-reliance on this one tactic — while evidently an effective and intelligent tactic — can’t have helped.

To be clear, I’m not criticising their ideas of playing Mbappé into the space behind the opposition’s backline and largely using Messi as a playmaker on the other end of those passes — I’d advocated the same in my PSG 2021/22 preview article for the September 2021 edition of Total Football Analysis magazine.

However, in the words of Sun Tzu: “All warfare is based on deception” — and perhaps PSG ended up being too predictable.

Could more unpredictability be something that Pochettino aims to achieve with his next club?

PSG ended the 2021/22 Ligue 1 campaign with the fewest crosses of any Ligue 1 side.

This was a stark contrast to previous campaigns in which they’d always ranked in the top half of the league for crosses, if not right at the very top.

I can understand this, to an extent, as PSG’s lack of an aerial threat in the box has been one of their biggest issues in recent seasons.

However, crosses don’t need to be aerial crosses and Guardiola’s Manchester City, who thrive off crosses of a different kind, have shown as much as they also lacked an aerial threat in the box last season but killed opponents with crosses of a different nature.

PSG avoided these kinds of attacks, rarely making low, drilled cutback crosses into high-xG areas — or crosses of another kind, for that matter.

Could adding more crosses to their game, especially with the likes of Di María and Achraf Hakimi in their ranks, have been a worthwhile venture to vary up their attacks? Poch had many weapons at his disposal and I think one question that needs to be asked of him is: did he make the most of all those weapons?

I think there perhaps could’ve been more variation to the attacking play and maybe that’s something new PSG boss Christophe Galtier will look to bring to the team, while it may be something that Pochettino looks to address with his next project, again, perhaps via recruitment and a desire to create different options that he would like by being backed 100% as he would hope.

Conclusion

To conclude this head coach-focused tactical analysis on Mauricio Pochettino, it’s clear to me that he exercised some great, sensible ideas during his time at PSG and was largely let down by the fact that although he had great talent at his disposal, it ultimately wasn’t a team that 100% fit his footballing ideals — something that would hinder any modern coach given how prominent adhering to certain playing philosophies has become at the highest level.

Pochettino is now free and will be linked with a plethora of jobs as they become available while he is free, but he must be careful about choosing his next job and ensure it’s one that gives him the best possible opportunity to show what a Mauricio Pochettino team is via their broad strategy and vision, including their approach in the transfer market.

Poch demonstrated excellent ideas at PSG, though at times he may have been too reliant on plan A and a little bit predictable.

With that said, if you watch the two legs, you can see that his team did come close to beating eventual winners Real Madrid in the Round of 16 despite all of their deficiencies without the ball — something you wouldn’t think from the public narrative surrounding him and his side.

So, backed fully and with plenty of lessons learned in Paris, I think the next Mauricio Pochettino team will excite and when the right match comes for Poch, it’s something that all football lovers should keep a close eye on, as he’s still one of the most exciting coaches in the game.