The benefits of nods and flicks at corner kicks and how to defend against them – set-piece analysis

With the development of teams in set-piece analysis and thus protecting the critical areas in the corners and marking the distinguished attackers at aerial duels with different defensive styles, whether zonal marking, man-marking or hybrid system, the attacking teams needed to find new ideas that target less important areas or less important players and thus unmarked, but in order to target more important areas or players later.

We will write about two different main ideas, nods and flicks. In the first idea, Teams sometimes target an unmarked player in far areas to nod the ball back towards the near post to a good player at aerial duels, exploiting the chaos that happens while the near-post defenders turn around and focus on the first conflict, neglecting the second targeted player at their back covering the off-side.

In flick-routines, attacking teams plan for winning the first touch before the near post depending on an excellent player at getting the first touch with the help of many tricks like moving from the defender’s blind side, blocks and screens and then exploiting the first touch attracts the attention of the defender neglecting the second targeted player moving at their back to score the goal.

In this tactical analysis, we will analyse the tactics used in these routines and the potential counter, giving examples from the Premier League, Bundesliga, Serie A, UEFA Champions League and the national team of Belgium.

Nods

In this idea, attacking teams target a player without marking because he isn’t a good player at aerial duels, so opponents neglect him, using him only to nod the ball to an excellent player at aerial duels in a better and nearer area. At the same time, the defenders give their attention to the first headed touch, forgetting the second targeted player at their back. Let’s explain in detail.

In the first photo, Man City use this idea by the principle of underloading against RB Leipzig’s four man-markers by targeting Bernardo Silva, who is free coming from the near post because he isn’t a dangerous player at aerial duels, so no one focuses on him while the other four attackers are unloading the targeted area for him dragging the man-markers with them, as in the second photo.

In the third photo, five attackers are framing the goal. Rodri blocks the zonal player in the middle to isolate the three attackers behind him against only the last zonal defender. At the same time, another drops back, standing on the line beside the goalkeeper, covering the off-side. Two attackers take the attention to free Erling Haaland behind him, who gets the headed pass, and the result is a goal, as in the fourth photo.

The counter idea

Borussia Mönchengladbach can deal with that idea against Bayern Munich, as we will explain in detail.

In the first photo, it is clear that they defended with five zonal players, three man-markers, a player against the short corner and a rebound player. In the second photo, Bayern Munich face these three man-markers with five attackers, so there are two players free, highlighted in blue, so one of them, the late one who is away from man-markers, moves toward the far post to nod the ball, so the first part is difficult to defend.

The attacking team can achieve numerical superiority in these outlying areas because the defending team focuses on the most critical areas near the goal, so the solution is using the off-side trap while taking care of the defenders’ back, not only focusing on the first touch, as we will explain in the third photo.

In the third photo, we see the zonal defender on the near post who will move with the line after the ball is played, as shown in the fourth photo, unlike the previous example.

In the first photo below, the five-player line is shown. We come to the second important thing that reduces the chaos: leaving the last two zonal defenders to go up to defend the first touch. At the same time, the three players on the near post are ready to defend the area behind them while keeping themselves on the same line, as in the second photo below.

In the third photo, they get closer and ready to cut the headed pass, and they succeed, as in the fourth photo.

Flicks

In this idea, attacking teams plan for winning the first touch before the near post depending on an excellent player at getting the first touch with the help of many tricks like moving from the defender’s blind side, blocks and screens and then exploiting that the first touch attracts the attention of the defender neglecting the second targeted player moving at their back to score the goal.

In this example, Newcastle defends with two zonal markers (highlighted in green); Miguel Almiron is there to defend the short corner if it happens, while Joe Willock defends the rebound zone. The remaining six players act as man-markers.

Clement Lenglet, with the green arrow, is the player who flicks the ball in this routine, so as the taker prepares to play, he starts moving in a curved run around the goalkeeper, using him as a screen to win a moment before his marker comes from Joelinton’s blind side. You can notice that there are seven players of Tottenham against six markers, so Eric Dier, with a yellow arrow, runs towards the near post to hit the ball if the ball passes Lenglet using Oliver Skipp as a screen.

To make sure that Lenglet can get the ball, Spurs need to block the two zonal markers we have mentioned, so when the taker prepares to move, Rodrigo Bentancur goes to block Joelinton (the yellow arrow) and Davinson Sanchez blocks Burn (the green arrow).

Here, the two blocks we have mentioned happen in green; Skipp, with a yellow arrow, returned to the rebound zone after having previously been performing the screen, and Yves Bissouma, with a red arrow, dragged his marker back to empty the area in front of the far post for Harry Kane.

Here, we can see the two blocks we have mentioned happen in green. With a yellow arrow, Skipp returned to the rebound zone after doing the screen and Bissouma, with a red arrow, dragged his marker back to empty the area in front of the far post for Kane. So, we come to the second part of the plan, which is the second targeted player, and here we can notice that the first principle Spurs depend on is that the marker, Kieran Tripper, has a problem in orientation that he can’t follow the ball and Kane at the same time.

Here, Kieran Tripper turns towards Harry Kane, losing connection with the ball. The second principle applied here is “mismatch” because if you put Kane in a 1v1 situation, he will have superiority.

The result is a goal, as shown below.

We go again to the Bundesliga, but this time to see how Bayern Munich used these tactics.

In the first photo, SC Freiburg defend with two zonal players, and the rest are man-markers while the attackers stand in a stack, noting that the targeted player is the last one highlighted.

He goes toward the near post in a curved run in the second photo. At the same time, his green mate moves in the same direction to distract the man who goes with him, making his targeted mate win a more second. Still, to ensure that he won’t catch him, the targeted player moves around his mate using him as a screen, as shown in the third and fourth photos, while Harry Kane goes to the far post, exploiting that his marker focuses on the ball and the first touch.

The screen is apparent below, in yellow.

The plan works, and the first targeted player gets the ball while Kane escapes at his marker’s back, which focuses on the first conflict, as shown below.

But the headed pass is inaccurate, so the ball goes behind Kane, not behind him, as shown below.

In this example, Genoa’s first targeted player comes from the middle to be in the zonal defenders’ blind side, but without any tactical huge tricks because they depend only on his strength over his marker, which is called a mismatch, to push his marker a little away then moves quickly to get the targeted area noting also all the rest attackers stand away with their markers which makes him have the space to show this mismatch.

In the second photo, he becomes accessible after the slight push. In contrast, the second targeted player moves to the far post, exploiting the orientation problem of his marker, who wants to follow the ball and give his back to him, so he loses communication with him, as in the third photo. The result is a goal, as in the fourth photo.

The counter idea

The ideal solution to deal with this routine is preventing the first touch in such a dangerous area because if the attacking team succeeds in flicking the ball into closer areas from the goal, it will be dangerous and difficult to control the situation, so big teams now have a player before the zonal line to get the first touch getting the flick, highlighted in red below, and then goes to help against the short corner, if it happens.

He gets the first touch against the attacker, who tries to flick the ball, killing the problem in its infancy, as shown below.

In this example, Belgium use a man-marking defending system by only two zonal players in green, but they use a blue player to go up and get the first touch or help against the short corner if it happens.

After the taker plays the ball before the near post, he defends this area, as shown below.

He gets the first touch, as shown below.

Conclusion

In this analysis, we discussed the two-headed touches routines by targeting less important areas or players at first to targeting important areas or players later with flicks and nods.