In our October Total Football Analysis magazine, we released an article on the Creighton University men’s soccer team and the data analytics in place at the NCAA school.

The full analysis is available here, but two metrics we covered in our interview were field tilt and xG per shot. After each match, the staff tracks those KPIs for the performance report and reviews the results with the players.

Presenting the statistics is one thing, but using the data as a teaching tool is the secret sauce. The stats aren’t presented as a simple means of evaluating performance. They’re viewed as tools to understand the game and ascribe value to specific actions and responses. That counterpressing instinct…PPDA tracks the response in defensive transition, but emphasising the stat expresses an intention, a way of understanding and approaching the game.

Taking a cue from that article, this tactical analysis focuses on box entries. Each section will start with in-game tactics and then progress to training ground implementation. We’ll discuss different methods of entering the box against organised defences and how to train those ideas. Whether from wide or centrally, we want to teach the players how to keep opponents off balance by creating multiple forms of box entry from a single setup.

Let’s start this tactical theory piece with box entries through the centre of the pitch.

Central overloads

Central box entries generate high-quality goal-scoring opportunities for both the most dangerous path forward and the most difficult to construct. Through passes and balls over the top are ways to get behind the backline, but we’re going to limit our focus to a more structured opposition that is prepared to defend in the defensive third.

Since we’re investigating how to attack an organised opponent defending in a low block, we want to identify the best practices for engagement for the attacking team. While there is no single way to approach box entry, we want to identify critical tactical principles that create opportunities to attack through Zone 14.

The way a team sets up will influence how they approach Zone 14 entries. A back three often corresponds to a single wingback or wide midfielder in each wing. That central concentration of the remaining eight field players creates tightly connected networks for central progression. When opponents become unbalanced centrally, an in-out-in pattern will move the opposition from the central channel into the wings, creating passing lanes to move them centrally once again, ideally with a better numeric situation.

The key here is that the central players understand the objective of the pass into the wings and how it relates to the next objective in possession. As the ball is pushed wide, some numbers are needed in support of the winger. As those players and the opponent move into the wings, shifting their block, the attackers who remain central must create outlets to play back inside and position themselves to quickly progress while the opponent is unbalanced in recovering from a broken press.

River Plate shows us the way forward. Compare the area occupied by the Racing press to the distribution of River Plate players. Some support was available in the wings, but there was a clear intention to move the ball into Zone 14 and attack the box from a central location.

One other note is the commitment of the players to push into high, central positions. The numbers are of the utmost importance. They enable the quick combination play that commits Racing’s deepest players near the ball. It’s sheer chaos for the backline and supporting midfielders.

Ultimately, River Plate was able to slip a runner into the box. That simple, central box entry is created by funnelling the opponent into the wings. Possession of the ball is a means of moving the press away from the area the attacking team wants to enter. In doing so, there’s less resistance to counter the forward progression.

To train the fluidity of attacking through central overloads, let’s create an exercise in Zone 14. For each of the exercises in this article, we’re assuming a 4-3-3. Adapt your players involved to replicate the personnel you’ll have on the pitch.

The focus group has their centre forward and two attacking centre midfielders inside Zone 14. On the wide lines, with two wide forwards offering wide outlets. They’re up against two centrebacks and two defensive mids. If the attacking team needs more help, add the #6 between the two counterattack goals as a deep outlet.

Since our final third play is fluid, so are the positional rotations from the attackers. If one of the interior players plays into the wide forwards, the players are allowed to switch roles. If the attack has too much success playing the wide forward into the box for a shot, add another defender along the backline.

The focus group attacks the full-sized goal, and the defending team can score on the two counterattack goals.

Some key coaching points include using tightly connected networks to draw the four defenders into too small an area. If the four defenders become unbalanced on the right side of the central channel, the players need to understand that the opportunity to enter the box will come from the left. To play out of the press, the players involved in creating that defensive overload must continuously work to keep those outlet passes alive, as must the players outside the press. Once the defending team overcommits, the pass out of the press must come quickly. Create space, then attack it as the opposition is caught out.

Given the small size of the space and the number of players involved, quick combinations and limited touches are necessary. That’s not to say that a touch limit should be imposed, but if the players are taking too many touches, ask guided questions about why they’re struggling to advance the ball, how the field space impacts their play and what change in approach can help them improve their performance. Their answers will help them better understand the requirements in 11v11 play.

A one and two-touch mentality is often necessary in this part of the pitch. Spatial limitations will lead to 2nd defenders offering good coverage to 1st defenders, so true 1v1s are not available, limiting the success of the dribble. This is where we can encourage the players to influence play off the ball. They should play into a teammate and tailor their movement off of the 1st or a 2nd attacker. Move when the opposition’s attention is on someone else, allowing for untracked runs. These runs can either lead to a return pass later down the line or serve as a decoy to create space for a teammate. In fact, coaching decoy runs behind the backline to drag the centrebacks deeper is another area to address in this exercise. Discuss how that run makes room for teammates to receive in the space vacated by the opposition’s centreback.

This variation can serve as an early exercise, followed by a larger space and more numbers. Extending the game to the width of the box and seven or eight field players (you can base this number off the opposition you’re preparing for) against the forwards and midfielders in the playing area supported by two outside-backs on the touchlines and centrebacks on the endline will give game-like repetitions.

Creating wide overloads

Creating those central attacking opportunities is predicated on shifting the opponent into the wings while pushing numbers high and centrally for Zone 14 entry. Move the ball to move the opponent, then attack the space you’ve created.

The connection between the central and wide overloads when creating box entry typically comes down to the positioning of the interior players. In the River Plate example, the central midfielders remained more concentrated in the interior portion of the half-space and in the central channel.

That’s a flexible setup. A simple five-meter shift nearer to the wing from those half-space players creates a tighter connection in the wings. Moving from one setup to the other is quick and fluid.

In this section, the idea is to use the strength of wide overloads to create box entries. Fortunately, Manchester City is excellent in this regard, so we have a great example. Though 4v5 in the red-shaded area, City still benefits from a qualitative superiority. Their tightly connected network in the wings positions them to retain possession and use those passes as a means of buying time for a run from deep. Once Kevin de Bruyne releases the ball, he sees the opportunity to run through the half-space and into the box.

Though his initial run is tracked, City keeps the ball in the wing long enough for De Bruyne to veer outside of his mark’s eyesight and receive a pass in the box. The quick cutback is played, and the second goal of the night smashed into the net.

That wide overload is designed to push the team into the box before sending a cutback cross or a driven ball across the goal mouth. Since the attacking team has so many numbers in the wings rather than the box, a standard cross will likely be a hopeful attempt, especially if the opposition remains balanced with their box defending.

As West Ham showed us over the weekend, those wide overloads create excellent opportunities to get behind the opposition’s backline, turn the corner and serve the ball into limited numbers. This tidy combination play below led to their first goal, with Jarrod Bowen initially participating in the overload before wheeling into the box to cap off the play.

Bowen based his movement on exploiting the space created by the run of Michail Antonio. As the centre forward drove into the box, he pushed the backline into a recovery towards goal. That created space for Bowen to move underneath and score.

By entering the box in the half-space, especially with that endline service, the opposition is forced to respond by dropping deeper and likely sending a defender out of the goal mouth to limit the first attacker. That allows for countermovements in the box and for late runners to join the attack on goal. Initially pushing the opposition’s midfield into the wing and then forcing the backline towards their goal line, the defending side is poorly positioned to deal with negative crosses.

We’re going to use half of the pitch to train wide overloads. The focus group will go to goal, and the defending team will use the two small counterattacking goals. Play is 8v8, though this is again where you can adapt the numbers to your and the opposition’s systems. An adaptation of this exercise includes a full 11 for the yellows with a full-sized goal at the bottom of the midfield circle with a goalkeeper.

To create the wide overloads, the wide forwards, attacking midfielders and outside-backs must operate in two of the five vertical channels. We want them tightly connected in the wings and wider portion of the half spaces. Given the yellow team’s expansive rest defence, patience is required. They are searching for the right scenario to engage the opponent and progress through the wings. If the defending team does well to limit progression in one wing, a switch of play through the holding midfielder is the preferred path to the other side of the pitch. As the lone, deep central player, he must work hard to remain an outlet for the overload group that’s in possession.

To preserve unpredictability and freedom in the final third, we want to give the players a couple of basic patterns to look for. First, if the wide overload can beat the opposition and enter the box through the wing or half space, take it. Look for superiorities that signal we should increase our attacking tempo and move forward.

Second, if the opponent does respond well and limits our chances of box entry, look for the switch of play. Let’s say the yellows are switching play from the left to the right. As the point of attack is switched, the left-sided players must understand that they are no longer the service providers. Rather, it’s their job to get into the box and attack services. As the ball is played across the pitch, they must move centrally to attack the goal.

Meanwhile, on the right side, the players must assess whether to send an early cross into the oncoming runners or decide to advance higher up the pitch with the hopes of entering the box.

Negative crosses become an option if the wide overload groups can get behind the opposition, turn the corner, and enter the box. Discuss the distribution of runs into the box.

Whichever course the players choose, help them understand the cues that signal one action or the other. That will take away some of the guesswork and lead to a better collective understanding of the tactical objectives in wide overload scenarios.

Isolation in the wings

Rephrasing those last two sections, the first commits numbers centrally and uses the wings as a means of moving the opponent away from the centre. The second commits numbers in the wings to attack the box through the half-space and limit central defenders for the final pass. In our final section, the goal is to push numbers high and centrally in preparation for a cross while bringing limited numbers into the wings to enable 1v1, 2v1 and 2v2 duels.

There are a couple of advantages to this approach. First, if a standard cross is played, the attacking team has numbers in the box to attack the delivery. Second, if the opponent fails to cover the duel, not protecting the space behind, there’s an opportunity for the attackers to turn the corner and enter the box from the wings. From a simple setup, two dangerous options emerge.

One crossover from outside football is how basketball players leave players who thrive driving through the lane to go 1v1. The four teammates simply hand him the ball and get out of the way, pushing as many opponents away from his path as possible.

We have many examples of this in football. The best example of isolating attackers to engage in 1v1 duels is Vinicius Junior. Real Madrid targets him in the wing and will offer limited help. Getting him 1v1 against opponents is the objective.

High-volume crossing teams replicate these tactics to ensure they have numbers in the box. Even if a side has traditional poachers and target men in the box, it’s common to see them work for higher quality services into the box, especially if there are midfielders prepared to run into the box. Newcastle did this well last season against Brighton.

The simultaneous activity is essential to note. As the ball is played wide, one goes in support while three players push into the box, two high and one underneath. A quick give-and-go beat Brighton in the wing and gave Newcastle box entry through the half-space.

As Newcastle looked for the final ball, the diversity of run, each on a different line and relation to the goal, maximised their chances of scoring.

This scenario is a dangerous one. The backline is retreating towards goal, and runners are more difficult to track as they move in and out of sight, especially with the defenders directing their attention towards the ball. Coaching the runs into the box is a point to emphasise in training, too. In the image above, the driven ball across the six is on, a runner is attacking the near post, and he’s dragging a defender to open up the negative pass to the penalty spot.

The setup is very similar to the wide overload exercise. One option to increase the number of reps is to start play on one side of the pitch (alternate sides after five reps) and give the attacking team the first two passes before going live. The ball is switched from one side of the pitch to the other, with the second pass coming from the holding mid.

We want to see the wide players attack in 2v1s and 1v1s. As play is switched, the attacking tempo must increase to take advantage of the numeric superiority.

Now, we have a few options here. If a 2v1 is set up, overlaps and underlaps to get behind the lone defender and enter the box are the obvious options. When that course is chosen, track the movements of your runners into the box and ensure at least three players arrive for the service.

A second option is to use the overlap as an opportunity to cut inside for a shot. If you play with inverted wingers, this is a movement to train. Determine which part of the field your player must get to for a realistic goal-scoring opportunity. Shots from the corner of the box carry a low probability of a goal, so work towards an understanding of whether this is an excellent shot to take with your personnel.

Finally, if your wingers decide to cut inside, can they connect with the centre forward and near-sided attacking mid to get behind the backline? This is a difficult movement, but the potential reward is massive. Plus, the winger releasing the ball to then run behind the line should leave his run untracked. If your group can pull this off, it’s one of the best forms of box entry you can manage against a low block.

Conclusion

When training box entries, the goal is to give the players base structures to attack the low block. It’s important to remember that these base structures should allow for a collective decision based on what the opposition is showing. Option B should be available if the defending team takes away Option A. Limiting the number of options the defending team can take away should create a clear path forward through another path.

These setups are designed to create a cohesive path into the box while also allowing for the moments of individual brilliance that are so common in the final third. Knowing that the defending team wants to make play predictable, the attackers must use their collective and individual qualities to unbalance the opponent.

With the small margin for error in the final third, especially against a low block, this tactical theory offers some ideas to develop a collective understanding of structures that facilitate box entries. This is an area that requires cohesion and understanding among the players. If developed, quality box entries should lead to improved goal-scoring opportunities.